ACCIDENT TO CHIEF OFFICER, AUGUST 2004 SUMMARY At about the same time the ship’s agent was telephoned by the port authority to say that a pilot was available to move the ship at 1800hrs. The decision was taken to move the ship at this time as it was considered to be “the sooner the better”. The last lorry left the berth at approximately 1610hrs and the yard gates were locked at 1630hrs. The ship’s agent attended the ship at approximately 1730hrs to enquire if he was required to attend for sailing. The Master replied that this would not be necessary. The agent then rang the wharf’s assistant manager at home to advise him of the revised sailing time. Although the assistant manager left almost immediately by car, he became held up in traffic and consequently did not arrive at the wharf until approximately 1820hrs by which time the ship had left. The pilot boarded the ship at approximately 1745hrs. The Chief Officer, as instructed by the Master, was standing by a bollard ashore arranging the forward spring into a “slip”. The other ropes still secured the ship although the head ropes were slack allowing the bow to move off the berth by approximately 1m. The tide was ebbing and fast approaching low water, which resulted in the main deck being approximately 2.5m below the top of the quay. Whilst pulling on the spring in order to take out some of the slack the Chief Officer lost his footing on the edge of the quay and started to fall. Once he realised what was happening he tried to turn the fall into a jump in order to prevent himself from falling between the ship and the quay or from landing on the guard rails. This resulted in him landing heavily on his feet on to the main deck just aft of two vent trunkings. He continued to fall towards the hold coaming and caught his chin against the hatch. He lost three teeth and broke his foot in the fall. With the assistance of one of the ABs the Chief Officer, clearly in shock, slowly made his way back to his cabin to await medical attention. However, the yard gates were locked, thus preventing an ambulance gaining access to the quay and with this in mind the pilot advised the Master to continue with the move to 36 berth. The remaining ropes were let go by another crew member whilst the ship was being held tight alongside the quay on the engines. The Master telephoned the ship’s agent to explain the situation, and asked the agent to arrange for either an ambulance or taxi to meet the ship on arrival to take the Chief Officer to hospital. His response was that as the ship had left the berth he was no longer responsible as the agent, and that the Master should contact a different agent [who was to handle the ship’s next contract] for assistance. Using VHF radio, the Port Authority made arrangements for the ship to be met at its next berth, from where the Chief Officer would be taken to hospital. CONCLUSIONS 2. The principal cause of the accident was the Master’s decision to leave the berth without shore-side assistance. He was not under any pressure to shift from either the berth operator or the ship’s owners to move the ship. 3. following a similar incident about 5 years earlier, the ship’s owners published a fleet circular stating: “climbing over piles of debris or other material is very dangerous and should never be contemplated. Masters who are requested to berth on quays or shift onto an area of a quay that is obstructed by rubbish, cargo debris or any other material should refuse to do so”. But on this occasion this internal advice was not followed. 4. Paragraph 25.3 of the Code of safe working Practices for Merchant Seamen (COSWP) deals specifically with mooring operations. Sub paragraph 25.3.1recommends that “a responsible officer should be in charge of each of the mooring parties”. At the time of the incident the two ABs were stationed forward and the Chief Officer and Engineer were stationed aft. 5. The ship’s agent had not given the berth operator sufficient notice to get to the site in time to let the ship go; and the agent’s response to the Master’s call for help is questionable. 6. The decision to continue with the move to 36 berth was driven in part by the lack of vehicle access to the site. This together with a taxi being called instead of an ambulance resulted in the Chief Officer not receiving any real medical attention for 40 minutes. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. It is a reasonably common and accepted practice for ship’s crew to tend the ropes when either shifting ship, mooring or un-mooring. However this should only be undertaken in extreme circumstances when shore-side assistance is not available. A proper risk assessment must be in place for this activity. Due regard to the contents of relevant rules and regulations should be taken in to account when developing risk assessments. 2. Although the issue of a lone worker attending the wharf to undertake mooring operations outside of normal working hours is not a contributory factor in this case, it does highlight the need for a safe system of work to be in place for this activity. Access may be remote with difficult and unsafe access routes. It is appreciated that a shore-side worker could have slipped just as easily as the Chief Officer when tending the rope and berth operators should review their own procedures as a matter of urgency. 3. The berth operator should review its own arrangements to allow the emergency services to gain vehicle access to the site outside of normal working hours. 4. Berth operators can help prevent slips, trips and falls, especially at bollards, by ensuring quay edges are kept free from obstruction and free from oil & ice, etc 5. The berth operator should consider providing Masters of visiting ships with an information sheet containing relevant telephone numbers etc together with a statement to the effect that ship’s staff are not to undertake mooring operations. 6. The berth operator should consider reminding the various agents of the requirement that mooring gangs should be in position 30 minutes prior to departure and to request sufficient notice is given to allow this to be achieved. |